Shorouk Express 
BAKU, Azerbaijan, June 27. A fresh blueprint,
grounded in practicality and know-how, is coming to light in
Eurasia as the old guard crumbles under the weight of geopolitical
tug-of-war.
Within this framework, Azerbaijan is no longer merely a transit
point: it has become a pivotal node, an integral component of the
logistical, energy, and politico-economic architecture of the
21st-century Silk Road.
On that account, Baku and Beijing have not just talked the talk,
but have walked the walk with solid agreements that have turned the
tide in their relationship. At the heart of this transformation are
two documents signed in May and June: an updated Cooperation Plan
within the Belt and Road Initiative and an Agreement on
International Multimodal Transport.
These documents are not statements of intent cloaked in
diplomatic labels. They are roadmaps and practical mechanisms that,
from a legal standpoint, formalize the synchronized and
institutional unification of Azerbaijan and China. Moreover, these
relations are founded on the logic of balanced symmetry of
interests rather than dependency. Baku has long surpassed the image
of a mere “transit territory”.
Today, it’s about the full integration of Azerbaijan into the
strategic infrastructure matrix designed by China. It’s not just
about being a checkpoint, but about becoming an equal participant
in transport and logistics processes, digital, financial, and
production chains. The action plan signed between the two nations
encompasses not only trade turnover but also joint production,
energy cooperation, and the creation of digital platforms.
Azerbaijan is becoming part of the technological ecosystem of the
Belt and Road Initiative, gaining access to China’s institutional
expertise, investment resources, and next-generation logistics
architecture.
The execution of the strategic initiative has been delegated to
the Ministry of Economy of the Republic of Azerbaijan, highlighting
the government’s prioritization of the endeavor and the elevated
degree of reciprocal confidence between Baku and Beijing. China is
actively interfacing with institutional stakeholders. The
subsequent pivotal phase—the Accord on Multimodal Transportation
ratified in June 2025—introduces, for the inaugural occasion, a
cohesive framework of legal, technical, and digital benchmarks for
transit operations traversing Azerbaijani jurisdiction.
This document delineates domains including electronic cargo
documentation, compliance with safety standards, and data
processing methodologies, culminating in a reduction of delivery
timelines between China and the Caspian region to a span of seven
to nine days—approximately 50% more efficient than the benchmarks
established two years prior. The outcomes are already quantifiable:
container throughput in Q1 2025 surged by 42.3 percent,
establishing a definitive benchmark within the Belt and Road
corridors. The Middle Corridor—extending through Kazakhstan, the
Caspian Sea, Azerbaijan, and Europe—has transcended its role as a
mere transit pathway; it is evolving into the principal conduit of
the emergent Eurasian economic landscape.
But the strategic partnership between Baku and Beijing has long
extended beyond logistics.
In May 2025, PowerChina confirmed its participation in
constructing a 500-megawatt solar power plant in the Jabrayil
district. Project implementation begins in August 2025 and will
serve as the flagship of Azerbaijan’s transition to green
energy.
Simultaneously, CNPC is in negotiations with SOCAR regarding the
modernization of gas processing and the potential export of
hydrogen to Europe. This isn’t just about exports; it’s about
establishing sustainable “clean energy” routes amid rising European
demand. All these developments are part of Azerbaijan’s new energy
strategy, approved in May.
The strategy is based on a synthesis of sustainable
infrastructure, diversified supplies, and an East–West balance. The
goal is to make the country an energy hub in a changing world—not
merely a bridge. The shift in routes is the result of political
changes, not just logistical optimization.
After 2024, the sanctions tug-of-war between China and the West
took a new turn, pushing Beijing to explore new avenues to Europe,
steering clear of Russian territory. The Middle Corridor—through
Kazakhstan, the Caspian Sea, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and then into
Europe—is now seen as the new norm, not an alternative. For China,
it reduces risks and ensures supply chain stability. For
Azerbaijan, it is a moment of strategic strengthening, where
geography, infrastructure, and sovereign policy become a formula
for influence.
Today, Azerbaijan is no longer just a “transit country” but an
architect of new Eurasian integration. It builds partnerships not
on dependence, but on pragmatic balance, legal precision, and
political neutrality. Beijing understands this and engages with
Baku not as a secondary partner but as a full-fledged element of
its global project.
This is the true value of this new stage in their relationship:
Azerbaijan is no longer an object, but a subject of Eurasian
geoeconomic transformation. Baku is at the epicenter of change,
shaping Eurasia’s new geo-economy. The numbers confirm this.
According to the International Union of Railways, in 2024, freight
traffic along the Middle Corridor reached 552,000 TEU.
The forecast for 2025 is 730,000 TEU. Notably, over 63 percent
of these freight flows pass through Azerbaijan. This isn’t just
logistics. It’s a recognition of Azerbaijan’s role as the main
Eurasian hub—a mediator between East and West. At the same time, it
signals growing interest, competition, and pressure, including from
Türkiye, Russia, and the EU. In a world where routes have become
political statements and containers are tools of strategic
influence, Azerbaijan is no longer a passive participant—it is a
co-author and operator of global projects.
The Belt and Road Initiative is no longer just a Chinese project
for Baku: it has become a joint platform, where Azerbaijan is an
equal architect. The cooperation plan and multimodal transport
agreement signed by Baku and Beijing from April through June 2025
have met mixed reactions globally.
On June 3, Turkish Transport Minister Abdulkadir Uraloglu
announced intentions to expand railway links with Azerbaijan and
join the prospective Zangezur Corridor.
Thus, a strategic triangle is forming—Ankara–Baku–Beijing—this
format could radically change the rules of the game on the Eurasian
continent. But Moscow and Tehran are concerned. On June 5, Iran’s
Foreign Ministry stated that the new routes allegedly “undermine
the stability of regional transit”.
Russia didn’t stop at words. In an official statement, the
Russian Foreign Ministry spoke of a “revision of priorities” along
the North–South Corridor—effectively an admission of losing
previous control over the South Caucasus. On April 23, 2025, a
Cooperation Plan and an additional Multimodal Transport Agreement
were signed between Azerbaijan and China in Beijing. These
documents are not merely symbolic acts or logistical protocols—they
are architectural drafts of the new Eurasian infrastructure. The
world has recognized: Azerbaijan can no longer be left out.
Without Baku, attempts to build alternative routes are doomed to
fail. The geopolitical map of transit has been redrawn, and its
center lies on the Caspian. The logic of modern Eurasian
cooperation no longer allows for formal roles. Azerbaijan is now
determining the trajectory and tempo on its own. Baku has moved
from being an observer to becoming a coordinator.
This is reflected in concrete infrastructure actions: the
construction of multimodal hubs based on the country’s main
internal nodes has begun; the Port of Baku is expanding; the Alat
transport junction is being modernized and transformed into a major
logistics and cargo center; a specialized cargo airport is being
planned; and digital solutions, including blockchain technologies,
are being implemented for cargo flow monitoring and management.
This transformation isn’t limited to steel and asphalt. Azerbaijan
is building a new kind of infrastructure—managed, automated, and
technologically sovereign.
Here, transport, digitization, and policy converge. Data from
the Baku International Sea Trade Port confirms the scale of what is
unfolding. In the first quarter of 2025, the port’s cargo turnover
increased by 38 percent compared to the same period last year. 71
percent of all containers originate from China. This means
Azerbaijan is no longer just a node in a supply chain—it is a
command hub of the entire logistics system between East and West.
Baku determines not only the direction of goods, but also the terms
of access, the pace of movement, and even the cost of transit. This
is a level of strategic influence where infrastructure stops being
merely functional and becomes a political tool.
Financial flows follow certain routes. The Asian Infrastructure
Investment Bank (AIIB) responded almost immediately to the
agreements signed between Azerbaijan and China. On April 24, the
bank announced its decision to allocate up to $1.2 billion for the
development of Azerbaijan’s logistics infrastructure.
The investments will support the construction of new
loading/unloading stations in Yevlakh and Ganja, digitalization of
logistics processes, and most importantly, the integration of
Azerbaijan into the “Digital Silk Road”. This is not just about
technical participation—it’s about transforming Baku into the
coordinating center of this system.
That distinction makes all the difference. The goal is for
Azerbaijan to define the rules and parameters of digital trade
between Asia and Europe, independently of external decisions. The
Middle Corridor, running through the Caspian, Azerbaijan, Georgia,
and Türkiye, effectively excludes traditional routes through
Russia. This shift is not driven by political fashion, but by
objective reasons: the route is faster, cheaper, and safer. If
shipping goods from China to Europe via Russia takes 27 days, via
Azerbaijan it takes just 10.4 days—a nearly threefold difference.
While shipping a 40-foot container along the Russian route costs an
average of $4,870, the Azerbaijani route costs $3,420.
This isn’t just savings—it’s a radical change in strategic
thinking: calculations outweigh ideology, speed replaces slogans,
and infrastructure dictates policy. Azerbaijan has become a system.
The new transit configuration of Eurasia passes through this
system, where each infrastructure element is backed by financing,
digital technology, and political decisions. In an environment of
sanctions, military risks, information warfare, and global
mistrust, it is not slogans that prevail—but routes. And the
winners are those routes that provide guarantees, speed, and
flexibility.
The agreements signed with China on April 23 are not just formal
documents – they formalized the truth that has long been clear to
regional and global players: Baku is not required to participate –
an agreement is concluded with Baku.
Because in the new logistics architecture of Eurasia, Azerbaijan
is a checkpoint, not a transit point. The world is changing, as are
its rules.
Old paths are falling by the wayside, and once-strong
partnerships are losing their grip on the reins.
Those who can institutionally secure their place in the new
logistics and energy regimes do not just attract attention – they
become indispensable players.
Azerbaijan is one of such strategic actors.
The country no longer plays according to scripts written by
others. Baku writes new chapters of Eurasian history on its
own.
