Shorouk Express
The Hungarian prime minister Viktor Orbán, once the enfant terrible of European politics and the herald of “illiberal democracy”, is attracting an growing cohort of admirers. Yet these mini-Orbáns may find their path less assured, and the future need not be as dark as it seems.
“Austria under Kickl: Orbán Next Door,” writes Patrick Guyton for the German daily Frankfurter Rundschau, responding to the likelihood that the neighbouring country will be led by a far-right chancellor, Herbert Kickl, for the first time since 1945.
The Freedom Party (FPÖ) leader, who led his party to victory in the autumn 2024 parliamentary elections with 28.8% of the vote, openly identifies Hungarian prime minister as his political role model. According to Guyton, this development raises concerns about Austria’s shift towards an illiberal democracy of the Hungarian type, particularly due to Kickl’s stance on media, minorities, and the European Union.
While some FPÖ representatives, such as Matthias Krenn from the party’s economic wing, present more moderate positions and reject extremism, critics warn of a “cultural war from the right” aimed at an “anti-democratic restructuring of the state”. Guyton notes that the political situation has sparked protests, which fall far short of the intensity of demonstrations against former FPÖ leader Jörg Haider in the early 1990s when the FPÖ first entered government. According to the German journalist, this may indicate a worrying dulling effect in society towards far-right tendencies.
Interesting article?
It was made possible by Voxeurop’s community. High-quality reporting and translation comes at a cost. To continue producing independent journalism, we need your support.
Subscribe or Donate
Fears of an “Orbánisation” of Austria under Herbert Kickl are overblown, argues Eszter Kováts, a Hungarian political scientist at the University of Vienna. Writing in Die Presse, she points out that the FPÖ leader lacks both the radical edge and – crucially – the constitutional supermajority that allowed Viktor Orbán to reshape Hungary after 2010. Yet the parallels are striking: both men share a talent for provocation and deploy a similar rhetorical trinity: opposition to migration, “gender politics” and the war in Ukraine. Their populist playbook relies heavily on dividing society into “us” and “them”. Mr Kickl’s ascendancy, Ms Kováts suggests, stems from mainstream parties’ growing disconnect with voters, particularly on immigration. While Mr Kickl may look to Budapest for inspiration, his political circumstances more closely mirror those of Giorgia Meloni in Italy or Geert Wilders in the Netherlands. These populist leaders, despite dire predictions, have proved more constrained by institutional checks than their Hungarian counterpart. The “Melonisation” or “Wildersisation” of Austria, Ms Kováts argues, offers a more fitting template than the spectre of Orbánism.
Just across the Danube from Austria, another would-be Orbán is testing the limits of his power. Robert Fico, Slovakia’s prime minister and leader of the nominally social-democratic SMER party, made waves with an unannounced pre-Christmas pilgrimage to Moscow to meet Vladimir Putin. The visit’s details remain shrouded in mystery, with even basic information about attendees and arrangements withheld from public scrutiny, notes Dušan Mikušovič of Denník N, a Bratislava news website.
Receive the best of European journalism straight to your inbox every Thursday
Mr Fico’s only account of the meeting came via social media, where he spoke of discussing Ukraine’s military situation, peace prospects, and his intention to “normalise” Slovak-Russian relations. He subsequently threatened to cut electricity supplies to Ukraine in retaliation for its halting of Russian gas transit to the EU. The Moscow visit, justified as part of his “sovereign policy to all four cardinal points”, fits a pattern: Denník N’s analysis shows the prime minister’s diplomatic compass increasingly points east and south, rather than west or north.
Yet Slovakia’s drift toward illiberalism has hit headwinds. A split in HLAS-SD, Fico’s coalition partner, has cost him his parliamentary majority. Meanwhile, more than 100,000 protesters have taken to the streets demanding transparent governance, rule of law, and rejection of Russian overtures. Mr Fico’s response – claiming a third of protesters were Ukrainian and denouncing the demonstrations as a foreign-backed coup attempt – has only fuelled the flames. As Matúš Kostolný observes, the situation echoes 2018, when the murder of journalist Ján Kuciak forced Fico’s resignation despite his parliamentary majority. “It may get messy,” Kostolny predicts, “but Fico is finished.”
Viktor Orbán and Herbert Hickl may soon welcome another ally from the Patriots for Europe faction in the European Parliament to the club of European prime ministers. In neighbouring Czech Republic, ANO party leader and Slovak-born billionaire Andrej Babiš is staging a comeback. Despite his limited rhetorical skills, Babiš has demonstrated a remarkable ability to appeal to voters across the political spectrum, with January polls by economic portal E15 putting his support at 35%.
Babiš, who was replaced in 2021 by Petr Fiala’s liberal-conservative coalition, is poised to return to power. While Fiala’s government has achieved notable success in foreign policy, particularly in supporting Ukraine, managing the refugee crisis, and ensuring energy security, it has struggled with domestic reforms and public communication, leading to record-low popularity.
Philosopher and commentator Petr Fischer, writing for Czech Radio, attributes Babiš’s success to his political acumen and pragmatic approach. “The 2025 version of Andrej Babiš demonstrates with every word that his ANO movement is part of a broader, significant global current that is taking control of the world and returning to common sense,” Fischer observes sarcastically. He argues that Trump provided a template for the ideologically depleted ANO, which European patriots are now copying for guaranteed success. “They have MAGA, Make America Great Again, we have MEGA, Make Europe Great Again,” declared the former and likely future Czech Prime Minister.
According to Fischer, the path to power follows a universal blueprint: systematic erosion of public debate through destructive social media campaigns, privatisation of public space serving the interests of the most vocal, and politics defined by the fight against perceived enemies – immigrants, economic competitors, and, in Europe’s case, EU institutions.
The arms pipeline: How Czech weapons reach Russian buyers
A sophisticated network of middlemen has made a mockery of EU sanctions on arms exports to Russia, reveals a striking investigation by Kristina Vejnbender. Her reporting for Investigace.cz platform shows how Czech weapons are reaching Russian buyers through an elaborate maze of Central Asian and Turkish intermediaries.
At Moscow’s recent Orel Expo 2024, Czech firearms were openly displayed, though at eye-watering prices – triple what they cost in Prague. Vejnbender’s investigation, conducted with The Insider and other media outlets, traces how Kazakh and Turkish companies serve as convenient conduits: in April 2024 alone, a Kazakh firm imported a substantial shipment of Czech ammunition, while a Turkish company arranged delivery of high-end optical equipment.
The numbers tell a compelling story: Czech arms exports to Kazakhstan have surged thirtyfold since 2018. Why such appetite for Czech weapons? As experts told Vejnbender, Russia’s domestic arsenal is showing its age, and Czech “sporting” weapons can readily serve military purposes.
